Comments of Media Attention to Crash of Commuter Plane

In May 2009, there was considerable media attention given to the conditions that resulted in a Continental Connection commuter plane, Flight 3407,  crashing during approach to Buffalo, New York on February 12, 2009. Here are a few comments from a 60-year veteran of flying as a Naval Aviator, an international airline pilot, and former FAA airline safety inspector responsible for safety at United Airlines many years ago, and based upon media and NTSB reports available at this time (May 13, 2009):

• NTSB personnel made a big point that the pilots had not been trained on what to do when the stick-shaker operates.
   
  • Reacting to a stick-shaker is about as natural as it can get. Understanding of what a stick-shaker activation means, and what the pilot must do, does not require intensive training. Just being told about it and the consequences of not doing what is natural should be all that is required and should always be a part of any even half-baked pilot training program.
     
  • As any pilot knows, including a 20-hour training pilot in a small single engine aircraft knows, when the aircraft is near a stall, the first reaction is to push forward on the control column to lower the nose, so as to gain airspeed, and simultaneously add power. While this writer was an inspector assigned to United Airlines, he showed pilots in large jet aircraft (DC-8 at that time), that the usual large loss of altitude with the standard approach-to-a-stall situation, that normally resulted in about 500 feet altitude loss, could be limited to about a 100-foot loss of altitude and a quick retaining of control and airspeed.)
     
  • The captain of that flight, instead of doing what any pilot knows to do to regain airspeed, pulled back on the control column instead of pushing forward, pushing the aircraft into a total stall. The aircraft then did what any pilot should know, and that is to go into what appears to be the start of a spin.
     
  • Also troubling, and indicative of total lack of competency to be operating as captain−or even as copilot−was the failure of the pilots to recognize the dangerous decay in airspeed. Airspeed is the most important element in flying. Without it, the aircraft plunges to the ground, which of course is the difference between life and death. And constant attention to airspeed is almost as natural as breathing.
    
  • Compounding the astounding lack of basic piloting skills was the copilot. As the stall warning sounded, she retracted the wing flaps, an action that increases the speed at which the aircraft stalls, and adancing the critical status from approach to a stall—to an actual stall. That unprofessional—stupid!--move insured that everyone on board would die!
     
  •  The cockpit voice recording showed a frightening lack of experience by the female copilot, who had never been in icing conditions before. She expressed alarm at the appearance of a normal and relatively minor accumulation of ice. That lack of experience shouldn't be encouraging to anyone sitting in the back of the aircraft. The same can be said of the captain, who had repeatedly failed periodic flight checks.
     
• Several statements made by NTSB personnel indicate a poor  understanding of flying and lack of much airline experience.  In the past, while an FAA airline safety inspector, this writer had observed the deterioration in the aviation background of NTSB personnel. That concern was shown several times to me by old time NTSB investigators expressing concern about the low level of understanding about the realities of airline flying.
   
• Information reaching this writer indicates that the poor level of experience and competency in the cockpit today is not rare. One example of this was a United Airlines Boeing 747 taking off from San Francisco airport that experienced a compressor stall in one of the engines immediately after lift-off. The pilot flying the aircraft mishandled the controls in such a way that lift was degraded, causing the giant aircraft to miss a hill on the climb-out path by a reported 100 feet.
   
• These conditions indicate that FAA inspectors were either:
   
  • Not experience and not competent (which this writer discovered of most inspectors at a main FAA facility responsible for training and competency at United Airlines.
     
  • Prevented from taking corrective action by FAA management (a common and deadly condition).
     
  • Apathetic inspectors that did not want any confrontation with either airline management or FAA management that would come from complaints about training and competency levels.

  With this type of incompetency existing despite what should be numerous checks and balances, this writer and former airline captain would fear getting on any commuter airliner.
  

• This write is the author of Unfriendly Skies: 20th & 21st Centuries, and has several key internet sites:

  • www.unfriendlyskies.com
  • www.defraudingamerica.com
  • www.transoceanairlines.com